CO129-497 - Public Offices - 1926 — Page 86

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I fear we should not take this optimism too literally,

He then raised the question of the recognition of other parts of China, I said that at the moment there was no question of that, At present we recognised no one, north or south.

He said that

was not enough: it might mean the split of China again. If we recognised the south we must not recognise anyone else; if it came to treaty revision with the south could the benefits thereof accrue to other parts of Chine, for example he could acquiesce in no arrangement whereby the militarists were placed in funde, no doubt alluding to Washington surtaxes and customs funds, though he did not mention the latter. I thought it wiser not to get drawn into details on this at this etape and again observed that we must be realists; supposing he took a knock in. the north, we should deal with that on its merits: and we left it at that, but it is evidently a point that will be made again later.

Lactly, he made the point strongly that he would never agree to negotiate collectively with the powers either as regards recognition or treaty rovision. He would insist on dealing with us, Great Britain, seperately and ad knowing that our action was not ettered by the necessity for the previous consent of others. I was cuerded, but rather hinted that it might be to his interest that we should carry the other powers with us if any thing ceme of the present discussions. But he repeated this point neveral times and begged me to be perfect.. ly general in what I told Saburi and Mayer of our

interview.

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